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Introduction 
 
‘As simple as ABC’ 
 
Anything But Clinton. That is how George W. Bush’s agenda was described right after he came into 
office in January 2001 as the 43th president of the United States of America (Poppe I). By that time, 
Bush had already openly criticized his predecessor on several fronts, of which the most notable was 
Clinton’s strategy of containment towards ‘rogue’ state Iraq. Saddam Hussein and his dictatorial 
regime had posed a challenge for several administrations already, as the leader defied multiple UN 
resolutions regarding weapons inspections, and ran biological and nuclear weapons programs on a 
large scale (Dunn 291). There is not one specific and fixed method that guarantees success when 
dealing with such a regime. There exists a wide range of different tools and instruments that can be 
deployed to confront a state that does not conform to the international norms. Different policy options 
have been taken by different presidents and their administrations, and in the case of Iraq, president 
Bush and his administration seemed very willing to take a different course of action compared to his 
predecessor. The decision to invade the country in 2003 showed indeed an abandonment of the 
strategy of containment, since the administration actively enforced regime change. But does this make 
Bush really as simple as ABC? Were Clinton and Bush really that different when it comes to their Iraq 
policy? It was Clinton who put his signature under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, that stated that it 
should be U.S. policy to support regime change in Iraq (Katzman 5).     
 This leads to the central question that will be addressed in this thesis: To what extent is there a 
continuity in the grand strategies of presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton with regards to their 
policy on Iraq? To answer this question, it is key to analyze and understand the grand strategies of 
both presidents. For the sake of clarity, grand strategy here is defined as a collection of plans and 
policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and 
economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest (Feaver). The term grand strategy and 
doctrine are often used interchangeably, while Dumbrell explains that this is not always correct as 
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doctrines do not always involve into a grand strategy (44, 45). However, the most common definition 
of a doctrine is “a set of prescriptions that specify how tools should be employed in the service of 
strategy and that serve as a guide to decision making” (Dumbrell 44). Keeping that in mind, it seems 
not problematic to use these terms interchangeably in this essay, as both are used here to describe 
foreign policy ideas and strategies. It is not always clear from the outset what an administration’s  
intended objective is, and it is not seldom seen that strategies are still being formed during terms of 
office. Often, academics only figure out the doctrine after a president resigns and passes the baton to 
his successor. Also, grand strategies are not only influenced by merely rational variables, such as 
threats or resources, but also by personal ideas or beliefs. Furthermore, presidents themselves can be 
influenced by these ideas and beliefs of others, and it would be impossible to identify exactly whose 
ideas influenced who and whether or not the ideas were already present. Keep in mind here that a 
president never decides completely on his own, he has his administration that backs him and consults 
him. Key officials and foreign policy advisors in the Clinton administrations were Secretaries of State 
Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisors Anthony Lake and Sandy 
Berger. For the Bush administration, key advisors and officials were National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and 
Vice-President  Dick Cheney.         
 By looking at speeches and official documents published and released by or on behalf of the 
president and his administration, one is able to get an insight in the grand strategy of a president. Many 
scholars have already done this, and tried to identify and interpret key components in both Clinton’s  
and Bush’s policy making that together form their foreign policy doctrine. It is therefore that this essay 
draws upon  secondary sources. It is particularly useful to look for scholars that analyzed both 
administration’s official National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, which are published annually.  
The NSS is naturally concerned with the national security issues of the United States and how to deal 
with them. Iraq was a major one. Thus, examining NSS documents can  provide a better insight in how 
the grand strategies of Clinton and Bush are related to and reflected in their Iraq policies. 
 Gaddis wrote an article that is of specific interest to this research, as he indeed compared the 
NSS documents of Clinton and Bush. Note here that this has been done in 2002, so before the actual 
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invasion of Iraq. Now, more than a decade later, it is useful to look back at this comparison and put it 
into a new perspective with newly acquired knowledge. Gaddis detected  several ‘innovations’ in the 
2002 NSS of Bush. Moreover, he found that the NSS of Bush was in general more pro-active and 
achieved a coherence that the Clinton administration  never did (Gaddis 51-54).   
 With regards to what scholars have written about Clinton’s foreign policy approach, Donnelly 
and Perry et al. both typecast it as predominantly defensive. The Clinton administration seemed 
interested in keeping the status quo with Iraq and a strategy of containment would be the best way to 
achieve this.  As well as Brinkley, they explain this by looking at the “roots of the Clinton doctrine”, 
which is according to them concerned with the economy and the enlargement of it. Donnelly also 
points out that even after the administration acknowledged that regime change was the best option for 
Iraq, they were still refusing to act directly. In general, many scholars agree that Clinton favored a 
multilateralist approach and liked the ideals of international cooperation, sustainable development, and 
collective security (Donnelly 10, 14). Brinkley even argues that ‘democratic enlargement’ is the title 
of the Clinton doctrine, as he and his administration were primarily concerned with the enlargement of 
democracy, freedom, and free markets, which indicates his passion for the economy again (111). Even 
though Dumbrell acknowledges the emphasis put on this concept of ‘democratic enlargement’, he does 
not agree with Brinkley about how the Clinton doctrine is best described. He would rather see it as a 
warning to ‘rogue states’, a concept used by Clinton to define ‘outlaw’ states, under which among 
other Iraq. Rogue states posed a threat to the democratic ‘family of nations’, presumably led by the 
United States (Dumbrell 54). Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor of Clinton, elaborates in 
particular upon the strategy of containment, and calls Clinton’s approach one of ‘dual containment’. 
This entails maintaining a favorable balance with their regional allies in the Middle East without 
relying on either Iran or Iraq. Lake argues that the Clinton administration was able to do this as it had 
several advantages that previous administrations did not have, for instance the ending of the Cold War. 
His contribution to the body of literature is that his identified advantages help in understanding the 
strategic choice for containment, and thus why Clinton did not opt for the use of force (Lake 46-49).
 A different group of authors, to which Bacevich belongs, do see Clinton as more assertive than 
how others have described him. Bacevich even argues that U.S. foreign policy militarized under 
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Clinton. He agrees with other academics that the president seemed to disdain the use of force in his 
early days. However, he states that force has become the preferred instrument of American statecraft, 
especially after the in 1998 resumed hostilities with Iraq. Even though Clinton might not have been 
eager to use the military, he was a successful commander-in-chief according to Bacevich (5-7). While 
most authors do not clearly express their opinion on the strategy, Rouleau is very skeptical and critical 
about Clinton’s strategy. The international sanctions posed on the regime harm the innocent Iraqis 
more than the regime itself, he argues (62, 63).  Obviously, it is also of great importance to know what 
already has been written on the ‘Bush Doctrine’. Note that scholars have looked at it with the intention 
of explaining the Iraq invasion, while at the same time the invasion itself can be seen as a key 
component and determiner of Bush’s grand strategy. It is intertwined and thus works both ways. There 
is a vast group of scholars who detect a shift in U.S. grand strategy after Bush came into office. They 
see, among other, a president who is willing to act unilateral, and who does not see containing and 
deterring Saddam as sufficient. Differences within this group exist as to what they view as the main 
cause for this shift. Many scholars, like Miller, put an emphasis on the importance of 9/11,  where 
others such as Flibbert regard personal ideas and beliefs as the main drivers for choosing a specific 
course of action. Specifically the ideas of neoconservatives have played a key role in influencing both 
administrations. This is especially true for the Bush administration, as many of its key officials were 
leading neoconservatives. This has been acknowledged and reflected upon by many scholars, 
including Miller, Monten, Flibbert, and Schmidt and Williams.     
 The Iraq invasion was highly controversial and there are several scholars who are skeptical 
towards the sincerity of the Bush administration. Everest and Kellner both accuse the administration of 
having a hidden agenda that pursued oil interests and even imperialism. However, most scholars 
disagree and believe that it was  genuine in its beliefs.      
 In order to answer the central  question of this thesis, it is necessary to understand the grand 
foreign policy visions or doctrines of both presidents and subsequently how this relates to and is 
reflected in their Iraq policy. Chapter I and II will discuss this for the Clinton and Bush administration 
respectively. In chapter III, a comparison will be made between the two administrations and their Iraq 
policy to find discontinuities and/or continuities. It is also in this chapter that the importance of 9/11 
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will be discussed with regards to whether that day was a ‘game changer’ or rather a ‘window of 
opportunity’ for the Bush administration in terms of overall strategy towards Iraq. In the academic 
world, different opinions exist on this matter and even though the main research question of this thesis 
does not directly address this debate, it helps to provide a new insight. This is because the found 
continuities in Clinton and Bush’s Iraq policy give reason to argue that 9/11 proved to be a window of 
opportunity. It also works the other way around. If a continuity or discontinuity is found, it is 
important to understand what role 9/11 played in this and whether or not it contributed to this 
continuity or discontinuity. Thus, even though it might not seem like it at first glance, the central 
question of this thesis and the discussion on whether or not 9/11 changed everything are closely 
related to each other in this case. Furthermore, the Iraq policy of Bush is an ever returning aspect when 
reading through the literature that has been written on him and his strategy. This is not the case for 
Clinton. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill that gap to a significant extent as it not only combines and 
compares the grand strategies of Clinton and Bush, but also compares them in relation to the policy on 
Iraq. The comparison contributes to a deeper understanding of why Iraq was invaded, as it becomes 
clear that the Bush administration built on ideas that were also existing in the Clinton administration.  
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Chapter I: Clinton and Democratic Enlargement 
 
 
Each president has to deal with many issues, both domestic and international ones. It is in the interest 
of this thesis to focus on how both presidents have managed the international (security) problems by 
means of a foreign policy strategy. Obviously, Iraq was such a concern. This chapter will discuss how 
the Clinton administration attempted to deal with Saddam by looking at its adopted strategy towards 
Iraq. This will be done after the broader vision of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy doctrine 
has been analyzed, as this contributes to a deeper understanding of why a specific course of action was 
taken.  
 
For a long time, it has not been clear what the foreign policy doctrine of Clinton entailed exactly. In 
the beginning of his presidency in 1993, Clinton even expressed a firm disinterest in international 
relations and foreign policy. Instead, he wanted to ‘focus like a laser beam on the economy’ and made 
it absolutely clear that U.S. economic interests would attain a high priority as long as he was in power 
(Donnelly 10; Brinkley 113). Clinton’s initial disinterest and difficulty to formulate a coherent foreign 
policy strategy should be put in a broader context. The Cold War had just ended, and the U.S. had 
never experienced so much power before. It had become a superpower economically, politically, 
military, and even culturally. As Walt explains, this led to a paradoxical implication for the conduct of 
foreign policy; ‘the paradox of unipolarity’. There is less to gain on the international stage if one is 
already at the top. Moreover, there were no significant enemies anymore. Hence, the U.S.  simply did 
not face an imminent geopolitical challenge anymore, like it did during the Cold War. The paradox 
here is thus that the U.S. has an unprecedented level of power, but was not sure what to do with it. In 
addition, this decrease in international stakes worked against any clear articulation of a new grand 
strategy (Walt 64, 65; Dumbrell 46).        
 Eventually, Clinton understood that the international community did demand global leadership 
from the United States, and great foreign policy meant forming a clear grand strategy. In September 
1993, Lake brought up the term ‘democratic enlargement’ and started working on a foreign policy 
blueprint for the years to come. The administration announced early on in its first term that democracy 
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promotion would be a key integrating principle of his foreign policy, next to economic development 
and national security. The concept of democratic enlargement had a strong identification between 
democracy and markets, and Lake stated that the world’s free community of market democracies 
should be enlarged. It becomes evident that democratization, free market expansion, and economic 
prosperity lay at the roots of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy ideas, as all four points of the 
blueprint focus on these concepts and the promotion of them (Brinkley 114, 116). Democracy 
promotion continued to be a central aspect of Clinton’s doctrine, as he identified the pursuit of human 
rights, democracy, and  ‘freedom’ as key to U.S. internationalism several years later, in 1999 
(Brinkley 114, 116; Dumbrell 46, 49; Rieffer and Mercer 390,391).    
 The expansion of democracy and its accompanying vast and free markets was to be achieved 
multilaterally. As Donnelly describes, “the Clinton administration was animated by the lofty ideals of 
international cooperation, sustainable development, and collective security” (10). With regards to 
international security and stability, speeches given by president Clinton during the first eight months 
of his term on his administration’s foreign policy also made clear that he was a proponent of 
multilateralism. He declared to be willing to calm the international landscape, but only if the United 
Nations or NATO stood on his side (Bacevich 9; Brinkley 112, 113). 
Given his enthusiasm for the economy and multilateralism, Clinton proved to be a real liberal 
Democrat. This also meant that any enthusiasm for the military and the use of force was hard to find. 
Peace is in the best interest of everyone, Clinton believed, and the preferred strategy of keeping it 
would be containment (Walt 67). Bacevich identified, in terms of views on the use of force, some key 
components of what he sees as the ‘Clinton doctrine’; a priority assigned to avoiding casualties, the 
emphasis of holding collateral damage to a minimum, and the expectation that the very prospect of the 
use of American military force will deter or persuade enemies (6). Thus, a distaste for the expansion of 
the military, and the actual direct use of it, is clear. As Clinton himself said: “We have learned that the 
world works better when differences are resolved by force of argument rather than force of arms” (qtd. 
in Donnelly 10). 
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A strategy of containment was thus regarded as the best option for ensuring peace in general, 
according to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy vision. The confidence in the effectiveness of 
deterrence was prominent. This is clearly reflected in Clinton’s Iraq policy. Shortly after coming into 
power, the administration announced a policy of ‘dual containment’ towards ‘rogue state’ Iraq. The 
logic of ‘dual containment’, as explained by Clinton’s National Security Advisor Lake, was to 
maintain a favorable balance with regional allies, those being Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, 
without depending on either Iran or Iraq. Both states needed to be contained. Lake elaborates on why 
this approach seemed suitable in an article published in ‘Foreign Affairs’ in 1994. He explains that the 
Clinton administration had several advantages that its predecessors did not have. The end of the Cold 
War meant that the strategic importance of Iran and Iraq had decreased massively, which made them 
unable to play the United States and the Soviet Union off against each other. Secondly, Iraq’s defeat in 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 reduced its military capabilities and brought its Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) under tight control. Hence, the country experienced more difficulties in 
challenging the United States as a superpower. Furthermore, the Gulf Cooperation Council states were 
more willing to enter into security arrangements with Washington after Iraq invaded Kuwait. And 
finally, in line with the third advantage, ties with regional allies have been strengthened (Lake 48, 49; 
Perry et al. 23).           
 But what did this strategy of containment entail practically? One aspect was imposing 
sanctions, which were predominantly economic, on the Iraqi regime in a multilateral way. Throughout 
the  Clinton administration’s time in power, the U.N. Security Council continued imposing sanctions 
that were already inflicted during the Bush senior administration.  Its initial purpose was to compel 
Iraq to withdraw out of Kuwait, which  it had invaded in 1990, and later to eliminate the development 
of WMD. In addition, no-fly zones were enforced and an internationally approved resolution put an 
arms embargo on Iraq in place. The Clinton administration was keen on maintaining these sanctions, 
as it concluded halfway through its term that this was the best strategy to contain Saddam. Even 
though the sanctions have been criticized for having disastrous implications for the Iraqi population, 
they have been successful in terms of diminishing revenue for Saddam and thus indirectly blocking the 
import of vital materials and technologies for producing WMD. Also, the arms embargo eroded much 
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of Iraq’s military capabilities. An additional positive effect of these sanctions was that Saddam felt 
compelled to accept weapon inspections of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 
which started its first inspections already in 1991 (Brown 79, 80; Lopez and Cortright 91; Perry et al. 
20, 21, 23).          
 During Clinton’s time in office, there occurred some specific incidents concerning Iraq that 
demanded the administration’s immediate attention. Already in 1993, a plot to assassinate former U.S. 
president Bush senior was uncovered by the Kuwaiti government. Washington reacted by firing 
Tomahawk missiles at an Iraqi intelligence agency. In 1994, Saddam deployed Iraqi troops near the 
Kuwaiti border. Clinton’s answer to this provocation was purely defensive, as he increased troop 
strength in the Persian Gulf with the aim of deterring Saddam. This reinforcement operation was 
called ‘Operation Vigilant Warrior’. Then, in 1998, Saddam defied the U.N. resolution when 
UNSCOM inspectors were forced out of Iraq. This led to another round of missiles ordered by the 
Clinton administration in the form of ‘Operation Desert Fox’, the largest one of all (Donnelly 10-12; 
Perry et al. 22-24). Although these actions could be interpreted symbolically, it showed first and 
foremost that the Clinton administration was reluctant to move directly against Saddam. By sending 
missiles instead of soldiers, the administration looked passive in the face of terrorism rather than 
determined (Donnelly 11, 12; Boot 2). Clinton’s aforementioned distaste of the direct use of military 
force is clearly visible in his Iraq policy, as well as his belief in deterrence given operation ‘Vigilant 
Warrior’.            
 Even though containment is the most fitting concept to describe Clinton’s foreign policy on 
Iraq and also in general, it is possible to identify a slight change throughout the years. During both 
terms in office, Saddam defied and disappointed the international community time and time again. He 
flaunted their will by ignoring and not complying to several U.N. resolutions. Moreover, in 1994, it 
turned out that the UNSCOM had been misled by the Iraqi regime, meaning that Iraq had 
manufactured nerve agent and that its biological warfare program was much more comprehensive and 
advanced than the inspectors had imagined. Also, the UNSCOM’s final report in January 1999 stated 
that they could not guarantee that Iraq did no longer possess WMD, or capabilities to develop them. 
Thus, several facts became clear during Clinton’s second term, which could not be ignored: Saddam’s 
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unwillingness to comply with U.N. resolutions, Saddam’s provocations by repeatedly moving to the 
brink of war, Saddam’s ongoing pursuit in acquiring WMD, and Saddam’s mistreatment of his own 
people (Donnelly 12; Perry et al. 20, 22). These observations led the administration to think about 
whether or not it would be better to have Saddam gone.      
 The accumulation of these incidents, and especially Saddam’s obstruction of weapon 
inspections, were reason for the Clinton administration to eventually declare the need for regime 
change in Iraq. It now seemed the best practical solution to the problem. Clinton put his signature 
under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) in 1998, which stated that it should be the formal policy of the 
U.S. to support regime change. It was a clear indication of Congressional support for a more robust 
effort to overthrow Saddam (Donnelly 14, 31; Katzman 5). Practically, it encompassed  a 
reinforcement of support for Iraqi groups opposing Saddam’s regime. The ILA gave Clinton the 
authority to spend $97 million on training and ‘non-lethal’ defense equipment. By supporting 
opposition groups, the administration hoped to set off an insurgency in Iraq itself. It had also 
supported the opposition earlier, but abandoned that policy after serious setbacks in 1996. The Iraqi 
National Congress (INC), which was formed as an umbrella opposition group in Iraq, became the 
main vehicle for U.S. support. The INC appeared the most viable, as it represented multiple Iraqi 
ethnicities and political ideologies (Perry et al. 25; Katzman 4, 5).     
 Although the signing of the ILA demonstrated the administration’s realization that the 
situation with Iraq was no longer sustainable, the act did not mention the use of direct force. Again, 
the administration showed an unwillingness to act military. There were other distractions such as the 
war in Kosovo, and Clinton’s presidential legacy would not be another messy invasion (Donnelly 14, 
15).  
 
Deterring, sanctioning, and a mild use of non-direct force were the components that together formed 
the Clinton administration’s foreign policy strategy of containment. Over the years, a shift from 
idealism to realpolitik within the Clinton administration is notable with regards to Iraq, caused by the 
continuous disregards of U.N. resolutions and provocations of Saddam (Walt 78). The ILA gave the 
administration the opportunity to financially support opposition groups, of which the most prominent 
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was the INC, with the purpose of promoting a rebellion in Iraq itself. The choice for containment is 
explainable in the light of Clinton’s general foreign policy doctrine, and the post- Cold War times in 
which he was president. Being a liberal Democrat, his personal beliefs made him focus on the 
economy and internationally on the expansion of free markets and democracy. Multilateralism was the 
way to go about international affairs, and the use of direct military force did not fit into his doctrine. 
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Chapter II: Bush, 9/11, and Neoconservatism 
 
Now that Clinton’s policy towards Iraq has been identified and explained, it is time to do the same for 
Bush and his administration. Each president has its own challenges to overcome, its own crises to deal 
with, and therefore each presidency is different. In the case of Bush, this crisis was without a doubt 
9/11. The importance of the events that happened on this day cannot be ignored, nor can the 
consequences. There is a general consensus among scholars that 9/11 had a significant influence on 
Bush’s strategy towards Iraq. It is of great importance to realize and keep in mind that his Iraq policy 
is  simultaneously seen as a key manifestation of the ‘Bush Doctrine’, as well as an element standing 
on its own that contributed to shaping the doctrine itself (Jervis 365). This is because 9/11 already 
happened after president Bush’s first eight months in office. Policy formation and the creation of a 
grand strategy or doctrine were then still in progress. 
 
The ‘Bush Doctrine’ has been discussed thoroughly by many scholars. It is widely acknowledged that 
strong neoconservative ideas were held within the Bush administration and that these ideas have 
influenced the administration’s foreign policy strategy in general, and also towards Iraq. 
Neoconservatism as a concept constantly recurs in the literature to describe the administration’s  
political ideas and values. The neoconservative vision underpinned the policy content of the Bush 
doctrine that eventually led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (McGlinchey 12; Miller 54; Schmidt and 
Williams 194).  
 But what exactly were these neoconservative ideas and values? Firstly, the Bush 
administration had a more traditional view on international relations compared to the Clinton 
administration. According to this view, foreign policy serves as the management of threats to U.S. 
national security (Dunn 283).  In efforts of doing so, it relied heavily on hard power instruments, as 
Bush and his key officials had a great confidence in the efficiency of military force. There was a firm 
willingness to fight. Instead of seeing the use of force as a last resort or even defeat as Clinton had 
done, it was seen as a useful means to an end by the Bush administration. The U.S. had often used 
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coercive diplomacy before and successful military interventions, such as in Kosovo, led to an increase 
in America’s estimation of the utility of force (Dunn 286; Flibbert 343; McGlinchey 22). 
 It is of great importance to understand that this confidence in military force is closely related 
to another tenet of neoconservatism. The Bush administration embraced the new status of the U.S. as a 
global hegemon, which it had become after the Cold War. This also meant that its military capabilities 
were superior in comparison to other countries. Neoconservative views hold that a unipolar 
international system and the global imbalance that comes from it, do not pose a threat to the 
international order. Rather, American hegemony and leadership is necessary and will contribute to 
peace and stability (Schmidt and Williams 195). The use of power, including military force, gets in 
this sense a social function. The Bush administration deemed itself a benevolent hegemon with 
unequaled power, and with that power came responsibilities, obligations, and opportunities (Flibbert 
331). This perception of being necessary and taking up leadership is also detected by Gaddis, who 
examined Bush’s rhetoric in the 2002 NSS document. The administration believed that as long as the 
superpower is a benign one, other states will prefer the management of the international system by one 
single hegemon. On top of that comes the belief that U.S. hegemony is acceptable because it has 
norms and values that are universal, and accepted by all other states (Gaddis 52). Thus, a strong sense 
of morality prevailed within the Bush administration. McGlinchey also sees this as an important 
characteristic of neoconservatism, as it “holds the domestic and international sphere to a clear moral 
and ideological standard and champions the use of militarism to further that standard globally” (22).  
An extremely important example of this moral standard is the notion of democracy promotion. 
Jervis, Miller, and Flibbert all identify democracy promotion as a key pillar of the Bush Doctrine. The 
NSS of 2002 starts by stating that the twentieth century’s struggles ended in the victory of freedom 
and that therefore a model of freedom, democracy, and free enterprise guarantees national success. 
Gaddis even states that Bush’s ultimate goal was to spread democracy everywhere (Jervis 366; 53). 
 The final essential characteristic of the Bush administration is its willingness to act unilaterally 
if necessary. The administration was convinced that pursuing its interests could best be done via 
unilateral strategies and as Dunn describes: “Unilateralism, (…), was the unifying theme across many 
of the foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the new [Bush] administration” (283). The Bush 
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administration was determined not to let multilateral coalitions constrain its freedom of action. The 
disastrous events that took place on 9/11 showed that security dangers were real and acute, and the 
U.S. should not be hindered by international organizations and their approval; it should be ready to act 
unilaterally in the face of (in)direct threats. It was able to do so because of the opportunities that came 
with its status as superpower (Dunn 283; Miller 46). 
 
When it comes to analyzing the Bush administration’s Iraq policy, it is of great important to reflect 
upon the significance of 9/11. The sudden attacks showed that even the U.S. was vulnerable to outside 
threats. Not only did it transform the way Americans thought about foreign policy, it also transformed 
president Bush and his closest advisors’ thinking. It suddenly became necessary to address potential 
threats and the administration realized that a strategy of containment and deterrence was no longer 
sufficient; it does not work against terrorists, proved by 9/11 itself. (O’Hanlon et al. 1; Wirtz and 
Russell 113, 116).          
 A change in policy was thus necessary, and the administration came up with a strategy of 
preemption and ‘preventive attack’. The 2002 NSS focused on this concept and showed that the Bush 
administration had broadened it. It was no longer “limited to the traditional definition of preemption     
–  striking an enemy as it prepares an attack – but also includes prevention – striking an enemy even in 
the absence of a specific evidence of a coming attack (O’Hanlon et al. 3).   
 In March 2003, Bush gave the order to invade Iraq, resulting in the successful overthrow of 
Saddam and his regime. The invasion was a perfect execution of the administration’s strategy of 
preemption as the main justifications for it were the suspicions that Saddam was in possession of 
WMD, and that he had ties with terrorist organization Al Qaeda, who had been responsible for the 
attacks on 9/11 (Flibbert 316). There was no reason to assume that Saddam was actually planning an 
attack against the U.S., but the fact that Iraq was threatening in general seemed to provide enough 
grounds for pursuing regime change by the use of force. Obviously, the expansion of the concept of 
preemption to one of preventive war served to legitimate this idea.     
 Thus, Bush and his administration were adapting and responding to a changed threat 
environment by remodeling and adjusting its doctrine and military capabilities to face the new threats 
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that challenged the U.S. (Wirtz and Russell 116). This is completely in line with the model of scholar 
Miller, which explains shifts in U.S. grand strategies with respect to national security.  He emphasizes 
the importance of the international material environment, as it functions as the ‘selector’ of ideas and 
the accompanying security strategy. The two variables are the distribution of power in the 
international system and the level of external threat. The four possible strategies are defensive or 
offensive  realism, and defensive or offensive liberalism. Miller detects a shift from defensive 
liberalism to offensive liberalism, which has been translated into a shift from containment to 
preemption in terms of policy adoption. The U.S. became hegemonic after the Cold War, which 
caused the adoption of a liberal approach. However, 9/11 meant an increased external threat and led to 
offensive liberalism. Offensive liberalism puts an emphasis on regime change through the use of force. 
Needless to say, the invasion of Iraq is a key manifestation of this liberal approach. Both Miller and 
Jervis also state that this policy adoption appeared the most fit after 9/11, as other strategies did not 
offer a an effective response to this type of threat. The strategy of containment and deterrence was not 
sufficient for dealing with terrorists and ‘rogue states’ such as Iraq, since they are risk-acceptant and 
prone to accident (Miller 26, 29, 34, 49, 53; Jervis 369). Also, with regards to the distribution of 
power, the notion of American benevolent hegemony can be seen implicitly in the choice for 
extending the concept of preemption. From this standpoint, a hegemonic America “was entitled to 
defend its primacy from both latent threats and open acts of defiance” (Flibbert 332).  
 As identified earlier in this chapter, the Bush administration was characterized by assertive 
unilateralism. Miller argues that the shift from a multilateral to a unilateral approach became most 
visible in the Iraq invasion. The prewar debate showed that the administration was willing to ignore 
the U.N. Security Council and other major allies, as it was ready to enforce regime change with or 
without the endorsement of the international community (Miller 46). This is reflected in Bush’s  
rhetoric in the period between 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. In public speeches right after 9/11, he 
asked the world to ‘join them’, indicating that the U.S. was the leader and deciding strategies on its 
own terms. The phrase “you are either with us or you are with the terrorists” also demonstrates that the 
U.S. is standing on its own in its fight against the enemy (qtd. in Dunn 283). Bush also appears to have 
said in private meetings that he did not want or need the consent of other nations, especially not if they 
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were going to set conditions for that. Washington sought its own solutions to its own security 
problems, in the form of a strategy of preemption (Dunn 283). Jervis elaborates on the link between 
unilateralism and this specific policy adoption. If approached multilaterally, it is hard to get consensus 
this type of strong actions – the use of direct military force. Therefore, other countries are reluctant 
and more than willing to let the superpower carry the burden (Jervis 373, 374).     
 
In conclusion, we have seen that the Bush administration opted for a different strategy towards Iraq 
than the Clinton administration; namely one of preemption. Containment and deterrence were no 
longer viable options. Multiple authors such as Wirtz and Russel, and O’Hanlon et al. agree that this 
change is explainable by looking at 9/11. It increased the level of external threat to the U.S. and forced 
the administration to think about ways to remove threats to the national security. One can conclude 
that the impact of 9/11 on U.S. Iraq policy was important and should not be underestimated. However, 
neoconservative ideas have also impacted the decision making process and the administration’s  
perspective. The ideas, pillars, or drivers on which the Bush Doctrine is based, according to Flibbert, 
Jervis and Dunn, also play a role in shaping the administration’s vision on the conduct of foreign 
policy and the international system. The Bush administration had the perception that the U.S. had 
certain duties because of its hegemonic role in the international order. Peace and stability require the 
U.S. to take up active leadership. Especially when U.S. security interests are at stake, this should be 
done unilaterally. This is in line with the administration’s traditional view on managing threats (Dunn 
291; Jervis 376). Another significant characteristic of the Bush administration, was that it promoted 
regime change and democracy promotion by the use of military force. The great confidence in the 
efficacy of the military is an explanation for this. The use of force was not eschewed, which is 
understandable given the neoconservative character of the Bush administration. It is of great 
importance to understand that both changes in the external environment and the neoconservative 
nature of the administration led to the policy adoption of preemptive war. These factors were 
intertwined and influenced each other significantly.  
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Chapter III : Only Discontinuities?  
 
The previous chapters have discussed and analyzed the Clinton administration and Bush 
administration respectively with regards to their Iraq policy. The next logical step is comparing the 
two. Iraq has been on the U.S.’ agenda for more than a decade and had proved to be a long term 
challenge that concerned more than one administration. It is therefore interesting to examine how the 
policy towards Iraq has changed – or how it has not changed. Are there predominantly discontinuities, 
or can one also detect a consistency in both Clinton’s and Bush’s ‘grand’ strategy on Iraq? As has 
already been discussed, the events on 9/11 were extremely significant. They influenced or even shaped 
the Bush doctrine to a large extent. It is therefore of great importance that the pre-9/11 policy approach 
of the Bush administration is reflected upon when looking for possible continuities. 
 
When comparing Clinton, Bush, their overall foreign policy ideas, and their ensuing Iraq policies, it is 
not difficult to see primarily differences rather than similarities. At first sight, one might wonder if 
there are any continuities at all. The mere fact that Clinton is a liberal Democrat and Bush a 
Republican, heavily influenced by neoconservative ideas, gives reason to think that the two approach 
matters completely different. And naturally, personal ideas and beliefs of presidents themselves and 
their key officials do have an impact on how policies are crafted.     
 A  clear example of this is the difference in how the military and the use of hard power is 
viewed. Where Clinton expressed a certain disdain for the direct use of military force, Bush and his 
administration put great confidence in its efficacy. Where Clinton would only deploy ground troops as 
an ultimate last resort, Bush would see it as an effective means to an end, especially if U.S. interests 
were acutely in danger and at stake. Another point in which the Clinton and Bush administrations are 
different, is the way in which they approach international problems. Clinton was an advocate of 
multilateralism, as he valued collaboration. In contrast, Bush and his foreign policy analysts sharply 
criticized the Clinton administration for its mushy multilateralism and military weakness (Donnelly 
15). Right from the start, and thus already before 9/11, the Bush administration rejected the Clintonian 
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premise that geo-economics  was at that time more important than geopolitics (Dunn 283).  
 In general, Gaddis finds that Bush’s national security strategy is more pro-active than the one 
crafted by Clinton and his national security team. Clinton solely attempts to ‘enlarge’ or ‘engage’ in 
democratic developments and  the spread of market economics, as he and his administration assumed 
that these movements are irreversible and inherent to the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the Bush 
Doctrine forms a more coherent and interconnected strategy, which is something that the Clinton 
administration never achieved according to both Gaddis and Dunn (53; 283). In addition, Bush 
criticized already from the outset the previous administration for not having formed clear priorities and 
a sense of what was important to U.S. interests (Dunn 283). 
 
Also, differences in the external environment affect policy outcomes as well. As Miller said, it 
functions as the ‘selector’ of ideas (29). External factors change, which makes each presidency 
different. Clinton’s environment was one in which he had to deal with the lack of a clear enemy, and 
accepting the role of the U.S. as an unparalleled hegemon. Bush on the contrary had an enemy, though 
not precisely clear. Terrorists raised the (perceived) threat level to the U.S. and Bush sought for a way 
to respond to it. Monten states here that “power and ideas are not mutually exclusive explanations, but 
interact to produce foreign policy outcomes of interest” (116).     
 Chapter II already showed that 9/11 had a significant impact on the decision making process 
of the Bush administration regarding Iraq. It contributed to the choice for invading Iraq by use of 
direct military force. According to the Bush administration, threats should be removed before they 
become imminent. Thus, 9/11 helped in adopting the strategy of ‘preemptive attack’, which is by 
many scholars seen as a key feature of the Bush Doctrine. One might say that 9/11 practically marks 
the beginning of the notorious Bush Doctrine. Not to say that this is not correct, but 9/11 was not the 
day that the Bush administration came into office, and what happened in terms of Iraq policy before 
9/11 is now being ignored.          
 Despite the harsh criticism of Bush on Clinton, the initial steps taken by his administration 
continued many of the policies developed by its predecessors. It continued the sanctions already 
imposed on Iraq, but revised some of them. State Secretary Colin Powell called for ‘smart sanctions’ 
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that would better target Iraq’s efforts to rebuild its military and WMD (Perry et al. 24; Donnelly 16). 
Furthermore, a change was made in the engagement rules of the no-fly zones. The new rules would 
allow activities that were banned previously under U.N. resolutions. For example, strikes were no 
longer limited to only air defense targets. Note here that this demonstrates the administration’s taste 
for unilateralism, as Powell stated that the U.S. reserved the right to take military action if facilities or 
ongoing activities were found that were inconsistent with their U.N. obligations (Perry et al. 24, 25). 
Lastly, one can also find a continuity in the strategy of supporting the Iraqi opposition as the Bush 
administration expanded and enhanced ties with the INC and others. Thus, prior to 9/11, the policy of 
containment was continued and even strengthened (Katzman 7, 8).  
 However, Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense at that time and a leading neoconservative, 
stated that there was not yet an option to overthrow Saddam in that period. There was not yet a 
“plausible plan” for regime change. Immediately after the beginning of its term, the Bush 
administration had made clear that Saddam was a major concern, and that it had strong intentions of 
ousting Saddam from power, as claimed by former Secretary of Treasury O’Neill (Katzman 7; Perry et 
al. 26, 27). Nonetheless, there was not a clear indication that Saddam was to be removed by military 
force and the administration was trying to develop an overall strategy during its first months in office, 
exploring multiple options instead of only military ones (Perry et al. 26, 27).    
 That does not mean that there was no call for enforced regime change in Iraq by U.S. power. 
Wolfowitz and other neoconservative key officials of the Bush administration, such as Cheney and 
Rumsfeld, already promoted the goal of removing Saddam from power military since the 1990’s 
(Miller 56; Brewer 242). Dunmire also describes that there was already a ‘plan’ written by Powell and 
Wolfowitz, representing Cheney’s ‘masterwork’ with regards to a post- Cold War security strategy 
(206). The Plan, as Dunmire calls it, was “designed to deal with the problem of maintaining military 
preeminence at an acceptable cost in the post- Cold War context” (206). This context was 
characterized by a ‘threat blank’, which means the lack of any known material threat. The Plan and its 
authors came into power with Bush’s election in 2000, and its tenets were, according to Dunmire, 
represented in the NSS of 2002 (206). Also important to note is that these men organized the 
neoconservative Project for the New American Century in 1997, to push for a larger military and 
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advocate a tougher line against Iraq. Furthermore, an open letter was signed by key Bush advisors and 
other leading Republicans and sent to Clinton in 1998. The content urged him to adopt a policy of 
regime change regarding Iraq. Not surprisingly, the Project for the New American Century actively 
lobbied Congress then to approve the ILA (Perry et al. 24; Brewer 242). Thus, there was a strong 
neoconservative sound for overthrowing the Iraqi regime by military force coming from prominent 
neoconservatives, who tried to influence the Clinton administration from the outside, and the Bush 
administration from the inside after they came into power. In addition, by 2001 the likelihood of a 
successful regime change via Iraqi opposition groups themselves seemed distant as they lacked unity 
and the necessary military capabilities (Perry et al 26). By then, “regime change in Iraq seemed 
increasingly to depend on major military action. In this respect, the ILA made future military action 
more, not less, likely” (Perry et al. 26).         
 This is interesting and useful information when assessing whether 9/11 was a so-called ‘game 
changer’ or rather a ‘window of opportunity’. There has been a scholarly debate about this question. 
Some authors regard 9/11 as the day that changed everything. And indeed, we have seen that there was 
a shift in U.S. strategy after 9/11, a shift from containment to  preemption. That strategy emerged out 
of fear for terrorists and rogue states, and led to a greater role for the military (Perry et al. 28). 
However, this is only one part of the equation. The other part is the desire for regime change. The call 
for regime change in Iraq has been heard before in both administrations. Bush officials had already 
discussed options for regime change in Iraq even prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, 
and it had already been put into law when the Clinton administration signed the ILA in 1998, making 
the goal of regime change in Iraq official U.S. policy (Heisbourg 76; Rieffer and Mercer 403). As 
noted above, the neoconservative influence has been of great importance. Even though Miller sees 
9/11 as the most important variable, as it raised the level of threat, he acknowledges that 
neoconservative thinkers consistently advanced similar ideas for a decade before 9/11. But, during that 
period, the environment was too benign, which made them unable to find enough support for their 
ideas (Miller 62).  Thus, “it was 9/11 that provided the political context in which the thinking of the 
neoconservatives could be turned into operational policy” (Halper and Clarke qtd. in Miller 62). Recall 
here that Wolfowitz, fierce advocate of regime change, said that they did not see a plausible plan yet 
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(Katzman 7). As Dunmire describes it, the ‘new Pearl Harbor’ of 9/11 could fill the ‘threat blank’ 
(217). This leads to the conclusion that 9/11 proved to be a window of opportunity for the Bush 
administration, of which many key officials and advisors were neoconservatives, to alter its policy and 
take a more aggressive stance publically towards Iraq. The eleventh of September 2001 did thus not 
change the ideas held about regime change in Iraq. These plans existed long before 9/11 and as Dunn 
states: “while American foreign policy after 9/11 represented a new level of international engagement, 
it was a policy change arising from new circumstances that was entirely consistent with the previous 
strategic approach” (Dunn 283). Another argument here is that there was no direct link between 9/11 
and Iraq. Why should an attack from a terrorist group based in Afghanistan lead to regime change in 
Iraq (Freedman 16)? Gershkoff and Kushner argue that 9/11 was used by the Bush administration to 
frame the war in Iraq to increase public support for its intended course of action (525). Bush never 
explicitly blamed Saddam for the events of 9/11, but “by consistently linking Iraq with terrorism and 
Al Qaeda he provided the context from which such a connection could be made (Gershkoff and 
Kushner 525).  This contributes to the argument that 9/11 was a window of opportunity, as it indicates 
that 9/11 was used to justify a plan that was already on the minds of Bush and his officials. 
 
Regardless of whether 9/11 was a game changer or rather a window of opportunity, it happened and 
left its mark on the Bush administration and their strategic approach towards Iraq. The strategy of 
preemption is what defines the Bush Doctrine to a large extent and it is clear that this is a significant 
discontinuity with Clinton’s strategy of containment. It is now time to elaborate upon the other part of 
the equation: regime change. The Clinton administration has clearly been interested in removing 
Saddam from power, even before it became official government policy via the ILA. The U.S. had 
supported a variety of attempts to remove Saddam, of which the overt support of external opposition 
groups is the most prominent example (Perry et al. 25). Furthermore, the Bush administration had 
restated the U.S. policy of regime change for Iraq during its election campaign in 2000 and noted that 
it was a policy of the previous administration (Katzman 7; Perry et al. 27).    
 Regime change was thus desired by both administrations. But why? An obvious reason is that 
Saddam posed a threat to U.S. security interests. But there is a deeper rationale. One that is inherently 
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linked to the perception of the U.S.’ own identity, and one that is seen as a long term solution to U.S. 
security interests in general. Namely democracy promotion; the ‘ultimate goal of the U.S.’ (Gaddis 
53). Both presidents stressed the importance of it and made it a central aspect and goal of their grand 
strategies. Bush expressed a genuine interest in what Clinton had called the enlargement of the 
democratic community and Rieffer and Mercer find that Bush and Clinton were very similar with 
respect to the emphasis put on democracy promotion (387, 400).     
 Monten stresses that democracy promotion is central to U.S. political identity and sense of 
national purpose; it is clearly not just another foreign policy instrument (113). Both presidents had 
grand ideas about bringing democracy and free markets to other parts of the world, believing that U.S. 
values are universal and applicable everywhere as long as the ‘tyrant’ has been removed (Jervis 366, 
367; Miller 48). This moral mission and a sense of doing good are rooted in U.S. history and the 
notion of ‘American Exceptionalism’. It can best be explained as a kind of foreign policy nationalism, 
or “a belief that U.S. foreign policy should substantively reflect the liberal political values that define 
the United States as a national political community and meaningfully distinguish it from others” 
(Monten 117). This taps deep American beliefs and traditions, and was enunciated by Wilson and 
echoed by Clinton (Jervis 366). It is clear that president Bush believed in this exceptionalism and the 
U.S.’ core self-image as champion of personal freedom (Rieffer and Mercer 386; 396). This appears 
from what he told one of his closest advisors shortly after 9/11: “We have an opportunity to restructure 
the world toward freedom, and we have to get it right” (qtd. in Jervis 368). Note here that 9/11 in this 
respect is also perceived as a window of opportunity. 
Next to fulfilling their ‘moral duty’ by promoting democracy around the world, the concept of 
democracy promotion is strategically interesting as well, as it could help to eliminate threats and thus 
security concerns. Democracy-promotion programs are in essence national security programs as well.  
The explanation for this is the strong belief of both administrations in the ‘Democratic Peace Theory’, 
which assumes that liberal democratic states do not wage war against each other (Rieffer and Mercer 
386, 398; Dumbrell 50). According to Flibbert, the idea that regime type is the principal determinant 
of a state’s foreign policy is one that was key in shaping the Bush doctrine and it therefore played a 
crucial role in the decision to go to war (341). Clinton shared this belief. He was convinced that “the 
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presence of market-based democracies plausibly would render the world a safer, richer place” 
(Brinkley 117). Note here that Clinton’s vision of democratic enlargement was more ‘econocentric’ 
than Bush’s vision (Brinkley 118). Moreover, and equally important, the idea that a regime change 
into democracy in Iraq could spread democracy throughout the rest of the Middle East prevailed 
within the Clinton and Bush administrations. Clinton likened enlargement to the ‘domino theory’ in 
reverse and considered the continuation of the Middle East peace process to be important to the global 
economy (Brinkley 116, 117). In the Bush administration, Wolfowitz argued for example that 
democratizing Iraq would have a positive and contagious effect throughout the region. Iraq could serve 
as a beacon and example for other Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, the administration argued that 
strong measures for liberating Iraq were necessary (Rieffer and Mercer 404; Miller 56; Jervis 367). 
Miller also states that the objective of the invasion of Iraq was not only to prevent Saddam from 
acquiring WMD, but more fundamentally to enforce regime change so that a more democratic one 
could be installed, aiming to “spread democracy into the heart of the Islamic world” (49). He 
continues explaining that offensive liberalists, who dominated the Bush administration, assume that 
through ‘domino’ or ‘bandwagoning’ dynamics the process of democratization will spread (Miller 49). 
This is also mentioned by Jervis as he explains that there was an expectation of a benign form of 
domino dynamics, as democracy in Iraq is assumed to  embolden the forces of freedom and prevent 
possible enemies from disturbing the peace (368).      
 For Bush, there was an additional reason. Removing Saddam and creating a peaceful, stable, 
and democratic Iraq would be a long term solution for the terrorism problem. Perhaps needless to say, 
this is linked to the belief in the Democratic Peace Theory. Democratization in Iraq and other countries 
in the region would eliminate the principal breeding ground for terrorism. It would undermine 
terrorism at its source (Miller 50; Gaddis 54; Monten 112).      
 Thus, the United States could combine its motivation of a national mission to do good in the 
world with the interest of advancing “its own expedient interests on the premise that liberal democratic 
states form a security community in which the probability of armed conflict is zero” by changing the 
Iraqi regime and promoting democracy (Rieffer and Mercer 386).  
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Two contending schools have developed with regards to the long-term strategy of democracy 
promotion: one perspective called ‘exemplarism’, while the other may be termed as ‘vindicationism’. 
As has turned out, both Clinton and Bush valued democracy promotion and regarded it as a central 
aspect of their foreign policy. It is therefore interesting to analyze whether or not a continuity can be 
found in how both presidents viewed democracy promotion. First of all, it is important to understand 
these terms. ‘Exemplarism’ builds on the U.S.’ self-identity as being unique and qualitatively different 
from other developed nations. It suggests that America’s (democratic) institutions and values should 
be preserved, often through isolation. The United States is able to exert influence on the world by 
serving as an example for others. An activist foreign policy is therefore not necessary, nor desired as 
‘exemplarists’ fear that such a policy might even corrupt liberal practices at home. ‘Vindicationism’  
on the other hand believes that the United States should move beyond example and spread its universal 
political institutions and values by means of active measures (Monten 113, 119).   
 Unsurprisingly, Bush clearly has a ‘vindicationist’ perception of democracy promotion, as 
regime change has been enforced by military operations. If invading another country does not count as  
an ‘active measure’, nothing does. The case of Clinton is slightly less obvious since Saddam was still 
in power after Clinton’s term ended. However, he did support opposition parties in Iraq in the hope 
that they would overthrow the regime themselves. Also, if Clinton would see democracy promotion in 
the light of ‘exemplarism’, he would not have engaged in humanitarian missions and nation-building. 
This is because ‘exemplarists’ believe that there are limits to the efficacy of democracy promotion, 
and they have been relatively skeptical towards the U.S. capacity to produce liberal change in the 
world (Walt 75; Monten 125).          
 So, both administrations saw democracy promotion on the long term in the ‘vindicationist’  
perspective. However, one could argue that the Bush administration showed a much stronger 
dedication to it than Clinton given the fact that the Bush administration advocated regime change by 
the use of military force. Again, the neoconservative influence plays an important role. According to 
Monten, neoconservatism falls completely within the vindicationist wing of U.S. nationalism (143). 
He goes on arguing that “the convergence of unipolarity and key ideological dimensions of 
neoconservatism have produced a particularly aggressive iteration of vindicationist democracy 
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promotion” (Monten 141). One could argue that 9/11 also caused a more aggressive stance towards 
Iraq as the administration wanted to prevent another possible attack that would cost many American 
lives as soon as possible.  
 
Concluding, there are more continuities between the Clinton administration and the Bush 
administration with regards to their Iraq policy than one might think initially. One continuity can be 
found in Bush’s policy towards Iraq in the months prior to 9/11. Clinton’s strategy of containment was 
continued, though altered a bit, and even strengthened. Another continuity, the most significant one, is 
to be found in what the administrations both hoped to achieve with their policy towards Iraq: a regime 
change into a peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraq by means of democracy promotion. Democracy 
promotion is strategically interesting as it serves as the perfect solution for combining on the one hand 
the U.S.’ moral mission of doing good and bringing freedom and universal American values to the rest 
of the world, and on the other hand the additional positive effect on security interests. Building on the 
Democratic Peace Theory and the expectation of a ‘domino’ effect, democracy promotion became one 
of the core aspects in foreign policy strategies for both presidents. There was an extra dimension to it 
for Bush, as he regarded regime change and democracy promotion in the case of Iraq as a fundamental 
and long term solution for terrorism. We have seen that vindicationist neoconservatives have 
advocated regime change by the use of U.S. military force long before 9/11 happened and influenced 
both administrations – Clinton via the Project of the New American Century and Bush via the 
neoconservatives that rose together with him to power and became his key officials and advisors in the 
administration. Taking this fact together with the fact that the Bush administration continued Clinton’s  
original strategy of containment, one can conclude that 9/11 was a window of opportunity rather than 
a real game changer. See here that the outcome of this research – the found continuities – helps to 
clarify the debate over how important 9/11 really was. It certainly led to a change in policy approach, 
which is probably the most significant discontinuity between the two presidents. However, it did not 
change the U.S.’ long term goal of removing Saddam from power and installing a more democratic 
regime in Iraq. The ILA of 1998 showed Clinton’s desire for regime change and, next to restating that 
policy in 2001 obviously, Bush showed its commitment to regime change by actually invading Iraq in 
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2003. Both administrations were convinced that Saddam needed to go. However, the way in which this 
should be achieved was viewed differently by both administrations. Clinton chose a strategy of 
containment for reasons already discussed before, Bush chose a strategy of preemptive attack.   
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Conclusion 
  
We have seen that the decision making processes that led to the outcome of a specific strategy towards 
Iraq have been influenced by both internal and external factors. By internal factors, I mean the 
personal values and ideas about foreign policy that were held by the administrations, regardless of the 
international environment. Bill Clinton was a liberal Democrat, enthusiastic about focusing on the 
economic prosperity and the enlargement of it by means of a multilateralist approach. With respect to 
Iraq, he did not show a willingness to act military, as he only saw the use of direct force as a last resort 
and undesirable. All of this is in contrast to George W. Bush, who is known to be a neoconservative 
Republican and not afraid to rely on U.S. hard power. Moreover, his foreign policy doctrine is 
characterized by preference for assertive unilateralism. There were also external factors. Clinton had to 
deal with the post-Cold War environment, in which there was no clear enemy, solely ‘rogue states’. It 
hindered him in forming a coherent grand strategy. Bush had to deal with the post-9/11 environment, 
which was quite different. It led to a shift from a strategy of (dual) containment to a strategy of 
preemptive attack, which marks the biggest discontinuity between the two administrations. However, 
we have seen that the Clinton and Bush administrations both pursued a dual-track policy of 
containment and regime change – at least initially (Perry et al. 19). This provides a strong ground for 
the assumption that 9/11 was a window of opportunity for the United States to finally enforce the 
regime change it had long been waiting for. 9/11 did not change everything; it solely, though 
important enough, changed only the practical side: the policy and strategic approach towards Iraq. The 
other side was the desire of regime change, which was already put into official U.S. policy by Clinton 
via the ILA and was eventually carried out by the Bush administration. There is a strong continuity to 
be found in the underlying purpose for developing a strategy towards Iraq in the first place. 
Democracy promotion has been advocated and hailed by both administrations, as it kills two birds 
with one stone. By promoting democracy and hopefully installing a democratic regime in Iraq, the 
U.S. unites its need to do good in the world with the need for ensuring national security by eliminating 
threats. The large amount of value attributed to this strategy comes from the belief in the Democratic 
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Peace Theory and a benign form of the Domino Theory. It should not be ignored that the unipolar 
post-Cold War environment in which the U.S. was the global hegemon contributed to placing the 
liberal approach of democracy promotion at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. In conclusion, the answer 
to the main research question of this thesis would be that there are definitely continuities in the grand 
strategies of Clinton and Bush with regards to their policy on Iraq. Namely in the policy approach of 
containment prior to 9/11, and most importantly in the desired goal behind their strategy: regime 
change and democracy promotion. We have seen that answering the main question of this research 
also indirectly answers the question on the significance of 9/11. The found continuities and the mere 
fact that there was not a direct link between 9/11 and Iraq show that 9/11 was a window of opportunity 
for the Bush administration. Turns out that after all, president George W. Bush was not ‘as simple as 
ABC’. 
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